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CAROL B. THOMPSON*

International Law of the Sea/Seed:
Public Domain versus Private
Commodity
ABSTRACT
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) prohibits privatizationor territorialcontrol over the
deep seas. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
recognizes sovereign rights over biodiversity within national
territories, but the World Trade Organization (WFO) permits
privatization of microorganisms and plans to incorporate seeds
and plants. Yet both the high seas and biodiversity (gene pool)
could be viewed as the common heritage of mankind- necessary
for human life, to be shared by all.
Why are seeds legally treated so differently from the seabed, the
former to be declared private property (WATO), the other
remaining available to all (UNCLOS)? This study compares
political contestations over jurisdiction for access and use, for
benefit sharing and governance of the sea versus the seed. The
conclusion discusses lessons from UNCLOS in delimitation of
private property of global resources for resolving the current
impasse over privatizationof the gene pool between the CBD and
WTO.
PUBLIC DOMAIN VERSUS PRIVATE COMMODITY
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas
(UNCLOS) ensured that the oceans' seabed remains part of the common
heritage of mankind, which is the major international legal delimitation
of private property on planet Earth. As discussed below, all have agreed
to the principles restricting the domain of private property, but creating
an international regime for the seabed remains a project in process. In
contrast, the World Trade Organization's (WTO) approach to patenting
of life forms, when fully implemented, changes international law to
*
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allow privatization of germplasm (seed). The legal regime promulgated
by the WTO's Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs),'
extends the concept of private property beyond previous international
interpretations, instead of delimiting it. The Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD)2 places germplasm under national sovereignty,
therefore also rejecting a common heritage approach to the genetic
commons, but for different reasons than TRIPs.
This study first discusses why the principles of natural law have
been used to establish the law of the sea but not the seed. Second, it
contrasts the degree of enclosure of seas versus seed. Third, the study
analyzes approaches to benefit sharing for the seas and for biodiversity
among UNCLOS, CBD, and TRIPS. 3 Finally, it shows the similarities and
important differences in governance over the seas and seed. The
conclusion discusses lessons from UNCLOS that could be utilized to try
to resolve the current impasse over privatization of the genetic commons
between the CBD and the WTO.
There are a number of reasons to compare international
agreements related to the seas or seed, for both are vital to sustaining all
life on earth. Made available by nature in abundant quantities, both
water and seed are renewable resources but may also be depleted to
scarcity levels. Pervasive throughout the earth's ecosystem, what
happens in one part of the seas or of the gene pool can affect other
interrelated parts. The seas and the gene pool lead to situations where
sovereign states are dependent on one another. 4 Historically, the nations
of the world have freely shared seas and seed, but now the international
regime toward both is changing. Exploring how and why will inform the
cross-disciplinary debates about sustaining both resources for future
generations.

1.

Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade

Negotiations, April 15,1994, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: MULTILATERAL

TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1995), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1995) [hereinafter WTO].
2. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818
(enacted Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter CBD].
3. Although there are other international agencies addressing policy toward control
over germplasm, this article focuses on the two because they define the debates. The U.N.'s
Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) International Undertaking on Plant Genetic
Resources is trying to elaborate the principles of the CBD, with some variance. The World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is promoting the TRIPs regime and UPOV 1991
on plant breeders' rights is integral to enforcing TRIPs.
4. PAT MOONEY, DAG HAMMERSKJOLD FOUND., THE LAW OF THE SEED- ANOTHER
DEVELOPMENT AND PLANT GENETIC REsouRcEs, 1-2 DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 54 (1983).
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NATURAL LAW AND THE COMMONS
Two principles, explicated long ago by Hugo Grotius, are central
foundations to natural law but remain highly debated. Grotius
recognized that discovery did not automatically confer property rights:
"discovery per se gives no legal rights over things unless before the
alleged discovery they were res nullis." 5 What was "discovered" by one
people might already be "occupied" by another.
The second principle from Grotius is closely related, expressing
that anything that can be used without loss to anyone else is res omnium
communis. 6 If constituted by nature in a way that, in serving one person,
it still suffices for the common use by all, it is common property. As an
example, Grotius offered, "seas were forever exempt from such private
ownership on account of their susceptibility to universal use." 7 Inland
seas very early were carved into territorial waters by empires and
kingdoms, but even after the formation of nation-states in the
seventeenth century, the high seas remained available for universal
navigation. Such a principle served well the mercantile desire for
freedom to explore to enhance trade and allowed maritime powers to
extend their domain.
A corollary to the second principle is that the entity ought to
remain in perpetuity, as when it was first created by nature, thereby
invoking responsibility for conservation. Everyone might have the
"natural right" to access, but everyone also has the responsibility
for
maintenance of the common property. To pollute or destroy violates the
principle. Entitlement, therefore, carries with it liability or accountability.8 This responsibility underlies the international discourse about
environmental security.
According to the natural law thesis, the universal right of access
and the universal obligation for conservation to common property are so
important that an individual's welfare should not be grounds for
abrogating those rights. Individual or national interests must serve the
higher order of protection of natural law, for that law serves all
5. JAMES B. MORRELL, THE LAW OF THE SEA: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 1982
TREATY AND ITS REJECTION BY THE UNITED STATES 174 (1992).

6.
7.

Id.
Id.

8.

S. SREENIVASA RAO, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF OCEAN RESOURCES: A CRITIQUE OF THE

CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA 389, 410 (1975). Levan B. Imnadze, Common Heritage of
Mankind: A Concept of Cooperation in Our Interdependent World, in THE LAW OF THE SEA IN
THE 1990s: A FRAMEWORK FOR FURTHER COOPERATION 312, 314 (Tadao Kuribayashi &

Edward Miles eds., 1992). Steven Forde, Natural Law, Theology and Morality in Locke, 45
AMER. J. POL. SCI. 396, 401-02 (2001).
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humankind. Practical or instrumentalist arguments to deny universal
access, with conservation, are not admissible as reasons to abrogate
natural law. Individual or unilateral enclosure is prohibited.
ACCEPTANCE OF NATURAL LAW FOR THE HIGH SEAS
The first International Convention on the Law of the Sea, held in
9
Paris in 1856, recognized the high seas as res omnium communis. The
Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 confirmed this natural law
approach to the high seas, which served well the interests of the
powerful who desired freedom of the seas for trade and for movement of
military equipment and personnel:
Freedom of the seas meant essentially non-regulation and
laissez-faire, which was in the interest of the big maritime
powers. This lack of law under the freedom of the seas
doctrine was often used in the nineteenth century by
European powers to threaten small states and obtain
10
concessions from them or simply to subjugate them.
Yet the principle of the freedom of the high seas was based on the
understanding that ocean resources were inexhaustible. By the end of
World War I, evidence contradicted this view and the League of Nations
initiated international regulation of high seas fishing in order to avert
extinction of commercially important fisheries; access was linked to
11
preservation of the resource base so important for all humans. Access
was regulated not to privatize the fisheries, which2 remained res omnium
communis, but to insure sufficient supplies for all.'
The apparent first act for enclosure of the seas was by President
Harry Truman, who declared in 1945 that the United States had the
exclusive right to exploit its territorial waters, defined as on or under the
continental shelf. 13 From 1945 to 1957, 41 other enclosure declarations or
4
laws were enacted by various countries.' In response, by 1956, landlocked countries started discussions for a United Nations Convention on

9.
10.

MORRELL, supra note 5, at 182.
R.P. Arand, Changing Concepts of Freedom of the Seas: A Historical Perspective, in

FREEDOM FOR THE SEAS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: OCEAN GOVERNANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL

HARMONY 72, 77 (Jon Van Dyke et al. eds., 1993).
11. MORRELL, supranote 5, at 176.
12. Id. at 177.
13. Shigeru Oda, Some Reflections on Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea, 27 YALE J.
INT'L L. 217, 217 (2002).
14. Id.
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the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) to halt these national territorial claims. 15
During these discussions, the UN General Assembly in 1970 established
that the use of the seas was for the benefit of humanity, equitably shared.
The seabed, ocean floor, and subsoil were declared
the common heritage of mankind.... [Tjhe exploitation of its
resources shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as
a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of states,
whether landlocked or coastal, and taking into particular
consideration the interests and needs of the developing
countries ....
[It ensured] the equitable sharing [of its]
16
benefits.
Technological developments made it possible to estimate the
wealth of the oceans, no longer viewed as a vast expanse of res nullis, but
as perhaps richer than the continents, in terms of flora, fauna, and
minerals. Technology made it possible to increase exponentially the
amount of fish caught and the depth at which minerals could be mined.
In practice, the high seas remained "free and open" (mare liberum) until
1995 when devastation of stocks and fishing further down the food chain
awakened the most entrepreneurial to the benefits of sustainable fishing;
the UN Fish Stock Agreement of 199517 recognizes that states must
enforce the "maximum sustainable yield" (MSY) to guarantee viable
stocks. Many stocks remain fished well beyond MSY, but now the
principle of limiting harvests is at least recognized. Some analysts think
fisheries must be brought into the common heritage of mankind in order
for them to survive.'8 At this point, the common heritage of mankind
principle most correctly refers to the seabed, its flora, fauna, and
minerals in the subsoil, not yet the mare liberum.
Coral reefs, mangroves, and estuaries are now considered
"among the most highly diverse, integrated and productive of the earth's

15. Id.
16. The resolution passed by 108 to 0 with 14 abstentions. G.A. Res. 2749, U.N. GAOR,
25th Sess.,
1, 7, 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2749(XXV) (1970), availableat http://www.dal.ca/wwwlaw/kindred.intllaw/Res2749.htm (last visited May 16, 2004).
17. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisionsof the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, U.N. Conf. on Straddling Fish Stocks & Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37 (1995, enacted Dec. 11, 2001),
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/texts/fish stocks_
agreement/CONF164_37.htm (last visited May 16, 2004).
18. Oda, supranote 13, at 220.
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ecosystems."19 An estimated 175 billion dry metric tons of minable
manganese nodules, containing as many as 30 elements, including
manganese, nickel, copper, and cobalt, cover about 15 percent of the
deep seabed. 20 If correct, these reserves far exceed known land
deposits. 21 Yet initial estimates tended to overestimate not the mineral
wealth, nor necessarily the ability of technology to mine it, but the
economic feasibility of such endeavors. Mining engineer John Mero
predicted in 1965 that by 1985 operations would be processing 50 million
tons of nodules annually. 22 However, those corporations that had seabed
mining technology also had substantial invested interest in the
continuing profitability of land-based minerals. Thus, mining of the
seabed has not yet become a growth industry. Nevertheless, this vast
potential wealth, located on the 70 percent of the earth's surface covered
by the oceans, 23 is the impetus for both the attempt to privatize the ocean
and the resistance to such an enclosure.
The principle of the common heritage of mankind recognizes no
sovereignty and no private property over a natural resource. Article 136
24
of the international law of the sea declared the deep seabed outside the
200-mile limit of national zones to be part of the "common heritage of
mankind." The deep seabed includes the ocean floor and subsoil and
their resources. Article 137 further prohibits any portion thereof to be
subject to state sovereignty. Other characteristics of a common heritage
are also incorporated into the Convention, with Article 143 calling for the
peaceful use of the seas and the promotion of marine scientific research
by all, including land-locked countries. Article 145 requires protection of
the marine environment.
The common heritage principle was adopted within an
international treaty mainly in recognition that high seas mineral
resources are non-renewable and that fisheries and flora, although
19. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR,
Annex II, Agenda Item 21, 1 17.72, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26, (1992), available at http://
2
www.un.org/documents/ga/confl5l/aconfl5l26- .htm (last visited May 16, 2004).
20. Jean Pierre Lavy, The InternationalSea-Bed Area, in A HANDBOOK ON THE NEW LAW
OF THE SEA 587, 598, 602 (Ren-Jean Dupuy & Daniel Vignes eds., 1991). See also LAWRENCE
JUDA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OCEAN USE MANAGEMENT: THE EVOLUTION OF OCEAN

GOvERNANCE 188-89 (1996); MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 339 (1986).
21. See JUDA, supra note 20, at 188.
22. John L. Mero, A Legal Regime for Deep Sea Mining, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 488, 497
(1970). See also JOHN L. MERO, THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE SEA (1965).
23. The ocean waters' average depth is four times the average elevation of land,
making the sea the largest ecosystem on earth.
24. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Final Act, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1245 (1982) (also reproduced as U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121)
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
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renewable, can be quickly depleted to extinction. Minerals, flora, and
fauna must be conserved to sustain the human race on earth. The goal of
environmental security, therefore, was fundamental to adoption of the
principle. Based on the principles of international law, discussed above,
environmental security for the high seas and ocean floors takes priority
over national security, economic or political: no state can use the
argument that its individual survival gives it privileged or exclusive use
over the oceans' natural resources. As Ambassador Chris Pinto of Sri
Lanka observed, UNCLOS initiates a "new international law of
cooperation," 25 which recognizes sovereignty, but one delimited by
cooperation for environmental security for all.
U.S. ROLE IN MODIFICATION OF COMMON HERITAGE
From 1958, the United States directed the discussions over the
definition of territorial waters under UNCLOS.26 Its delegations
especially wanted to define the freedom of navigation, right of innocent
passage, and over-flight rights in ways to facilitate the movement of its
armed forces around the world. Without exception, every U.S. definition
was honored in the UNCLOS final draft.
In 1970, 1971, and 1974, the United States refused two
corporations, Kennecott and Deep Sea Ventures, exclusive rights to
explore the seabed: "The State Department does not recognize exclusive
mining rights to the mineral resources of an area beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction." 27 The corporations also applied to Canada,
Australia, and the United Kingdom for such jurisdiction and were
28
denied.

25.

Elizabeth Mann Borgese, The Process of Creating an International Ocean Regime to

Protect the Ocean's Resources, in FREEDOM FOR THE SEAS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: OCEAN
GOVERNANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL HARMONY 23, 28 (Jon Van Dyke et al. eds., 1993).

26. Because discussions to formulate UNCLOS extended from 1958 to 1994 and the
United States still offers new interpretations, this section cannot address all of the
diplomatic efforts by many experts. For more thorough discussions of the changing
discourse, see ROSS D. ECKERT, THE ENCLOSURE OF THE OCEAN RESOURCES: ECONOMICS AND

THE LAW OF THE SEA (1979); FREEDOM FOR THE SEAS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: OCEAN
GOVERNANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL HARMONY (Jon Van Dyke et al. eds., 1993); CLYDE
SANGER, ORDERING THE OCEANS: THE MAKING OF THE LAW OF THE SEA (1986); J.M. Spectar,
Elephants, Donkeys, or Other Creatures? Presidential Election Cycles and International Law of the
Global Commons, 15 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV., 975 (2000).
27.

MARKUS G. SCHMIDT, COMMON HERITAGE OR COMMON BURDEN? 37 (1989) (quoting

U.S. Department of State Statement on Claim of Exclusive Mining Rights by Deepsea
Ventures, Inc., 14 ILM. 66 (1975)).
28. Id.
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The Reagan Administration, however, introduced the argument
that freedom of the high seas, recognized by all for navigation, could be
29
extended to the exploitation of minerals, ensuring that seabed minerals
were open to all on a "first come" basis. Developing countries, which
had no technology to mine the seabed, refused this interpretation, most
eloquently expressed by the Indonesian negotiator Hasjim Djalal:
It is no longer possible to regard the seabed resources as
free for all under the disguise of the freedom of the sea. In
fact, it has never been regarded as such... .To contend that
the principles of the common heritage of mankind permits
the exploitation of the deep seabed only by those who are
capable of exploiting it is, to say the least, illogical and
unjust. Such a contention would lead to the colonization of
the international seabed and its resources solely by those
who currently have the technology, financial capacity and
organizational ability to do so. This interpretation would
obviously only benefit private companies and Indusof the
trialized countries, thereby making a 3mockery
0
mankind.
of
heritage
common
of
principle
During the years of the debate, the United States and other
industrialized countries refused to submit to the treaty until it formally
entered into force, thereby allowing mining of the seabed solely for
private profit. Any delaying tactics in submitting to compromise
rewarded those private interests. Industrialized nations also refused the
principle of jus cogens for the Convention. Jus Cogens would have
ensured that any treaty abrogating norms of the Convention would be
void. But the rejection of the principle meant that the Convention can be
derogated by any other treaty.
Negotiations were recommenced in 1990 to revise the seabed
provisions. The subsequent amendments in Part XI are the most
significant in modifying the original intent of the Convention. The
United States insisted that current seabed mining claims be honored and
not be subject to the international regulatory authority. Further, the
United States won the demand to eliminate any responsibility to transfer
31
or share technology with other countries. The U.S. State Department
29. See Hasjim Djalal, Law of the Sea Conference: Other Alternatives for Seabed Mining?, 3
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 39, 42-43 (1981).
30. Id. at 43-44.
31. Erin Clancy, The Tragedy of the Global Commons, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 601, 612
(1998); Ctr. for Defense Info., The Law of the Sea, 29 DEFENSE MONITOR 4 (Feb. 2000), available
2
at http://www.cdi.org/dm/2000/issue / law-of-sea.htmi (last visited May 16, 2004).
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concluded, "Early adherence by the United States to the Convention and
the Agreement [Part XI] is important to maintain a stable legal regime for
all uses of the sea... .Maintenance of such stability is vital to the United
States' national security and economic strength." 32
Open for signing since 1982, UNCLOS was finally signed by
President Clinton in 1994, mainly because of the Part XI amendments. 33
UNCLOS came into force in November 1994, without U.S. ratification.
The United States had a provisional right (1994-1998) to participate in
administering UNCLOS, but is now barred from membership on the
Law of the Sea Tribunal and the Continental Shelf Commission, and it
can no longer name members to arbitration panels.34
REJECTION OF NATURAL LAW FOR SEED
The protracted discussions over use of the seas' natural
resources meant that the industrialized nations ignored many of the
provisions and continued to advance explorations and to fish beyond
sustainability; the United States cited the lack of a treaty to validate
unilateral action.35 Further, "free access for all" privileged those who had
the technology to access deep waters, resulting in inequitable harvesting
of the seas' resources
Given the difficulty of bringing the United States and other
industrialized countries to honor UNCLOS, those involved in
formulating the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) decided that
the common heritage principle left natural resources open for the
taking.36 Instead, the CBD placed biodiversity under national
sovereignty, enlisting the power of individual states to join the
international authority in preserving global biodiversity. 37

32. BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT'L ENVTL. & ScI. AFF., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FACT SHEET:
U.S. OCEANS POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION (May 28, 1998), at

http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/oceans/fs-oceans-los.html
2004) [hereinafter FACT SHEET: U.S. OCEANS POLICY].
33. Ctr. for Defense Info., supra note 31
34. Id.
35.

(last visited May 16,

ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 385 (1986).

36. Christopher C. Joyner, Biodiversity in the Marine Environment: Resource Implications
for the Law of the Sea, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 635, 648-49 (1995).
37. The United States initiated the discussions for the CBD in 1987 by proposing to the
UN Environmental Program (UNEP) Governing Council that a group begin work on a
global convention on biological diversity in order to rationalize relations among various
secretariats representing multiple international conservation agreements. By 1989, the
United States was strongly disputing the suggestion to include biotechnology; developing
countries replied that, if biotechnology were excluded, they would oppose any new
convention. PAMELA S. CHASEK, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS: ANALYZING THIRTY YEARS OF
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The gene pool may be the "common heritage" of all peoples, but
the approach taken by the CBD recognizes that specific seeds, and their
improvement over centuries, can be traced to specific indigenous
communities. 38 Without care and preservation of knowledge about the
seeds, humanity would suffer a lower quality of life in terms of food and
medicine. Further, seed defines the identity of indigenous peoples, for
myths and creation stories incorporate native seed. Indigenous peoples
have preserved seed varieties and improved them for local conditions;
they have freely exchanged seeds, with the information about their use
for food, medicine, or industry, thereby transforming local varieties into
global biodiversity. Respecting seed as integral to identity of a people
and to sustenance, the CBD recognized the importance of national
governments in seed exchange and preservation.
At the same time, however, the Trade Related Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs) of the WTO allows and promotes principles
opposite those of the CBD. It too rejects the common heritage approach
of UNCLOS but for contrary reasons. Negotiated between the United
39
States and the European Union, with the rest of the world not full
participants, the industrial powers rejected the delimitation of private
property enshrined in UNCLOS. Arguing that innovation is driven by
the profit motive, the corporate and state powers demanded that
discoveries involving recombinant DNA (rDNA) be declared
"intellectual property," admissible for patenting. This approach applied
to microorganisms (mainly bacteria) and biological processes, allowing
for the patenting of life. The TRIPs called for extending intellectual
property protection over biotechnological changes to plants by 2000 but

ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 117-18 (2001); see generally FIONA MCCONNELL, THE BIODIVERSITY CONVENTION: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1996).

38. CBD, supra note 2, pmbl. and art. 80).
39. Thirteen major U.S. corporations formed the Intellectual Property Committee to
lobby for a comprehensive intellectual property rights (IPRs) agreement within the WTO.
The industry hails the TRIPs agreement as a great success in seed development, with the
corporations obtaining the protection they wanted. A representative from Monsanto stated,
"What I have described to you is absolutely unprecedented in GATT. Industry has
identified a major problem [IPRs] in international trade. It crafted a solution, reduced it to a
concrete proposal [TRIPs] and sold it to our own and other governments." Susan K. Sell,
The Origins of a Trade-Based Approach to Intellectual Property Protection, 17 SCI. COMM. 163,
181 (1995).
The 13 corporations were the following: Monsanto, DuPont, (chemical); BristolMyers, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Pfizer (pharmaceuticals); IBM, Hewlett-Packard, GM
(computers); GE, Rockwell, FMC Corp (aerospace); Warner Communications
(entertainment). ROBIN PISTORIIS & JEROEN VAN WIJK, THE EXPLOITATION OF PLANT
GENETIC INFORMATION-POLITICAL STRATEGIES IN CROP DEVELOPMENT 155 (1999).
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has not been implemented yet because of resistance by the international
community.
Although patenting of life forms dated back to 1980 for the
United States, 40 it was not until 1995 and the WTO that such a cultural
legal peculiarity was extended to the world. 41 For the global community,
TRIPs transformed scientific discoveries within nature into patentable
commodities, privatized for profit for 20 years. Whether or not the
discovery would benefit humanity as a whole became secondary,
reversing the approach of UNCLOS.
At the same time, TRIPs did not extend patent rights over plants
improved in the farmers' fields; that transformation was considered
natural and unstable and, therefore, unpatentable. Such plants,
according to the logic of the industrial powers, remained part of the
genetic commons and was available to all, free for the taking. Thus, what
is altered in a biotech lab is patentable; what is altered in the fields is not.
Applying patent laws designed for inventions to genetically modified
organisms (GMOs), first ruled by the landmark 1980 U.S. Supreme Court
case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,42 gave property rights to corporations for
what they did have, biotech genetic modifications. It left what they did
not have, biodiversity, open and free to all.
The promoters of TRIPs also prefer one universal international
law over intellectual property law to facilitate global trade. Various
national codes, with highly variable provisions for conditions for a
patent, length of a patent, and licensing of technology, were declared as
blockages to trade; having to respond to various patent laws reduced
profit. Previously, the life of a patent could be anywhere from five to 30
years, depending on the economic or cultural importance of the item, but
TRIPs set a universal duration. Patenting puts the innovation into the
public domain but gives the corporation monopoly ownership for 20
years, thereby guaranteeing profit.
The TRIPs law also departs from previous legal practice in that it
reverses the burden of proof. Around the world, the innovator had the
burden of proving that his/her invention had been stolen or copied.
Under TRIPs, the innovator can merely accuse another of stealing
intellectual property and the accused must prove she/he did not. Such a
reversal gives an advantage to the patent holder, who no longer has to
40. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
41. Marjorie Cohn, The IWTO: A New World Government Dedicated to the Principle that
Property Interests Are More Sacred Than Human Rights, 57 GUILD PRAC. 134, 139 (2000).
CHRISTOPHER MAY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
THE NEW ENCLOSURES? (2000).

42.

Diamond,447 U.S. 303.
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gather evidence to sustain the accusation; the alleged "copier" is "guilty"
until proven innocent.
Environmental security, central to the law of the sea, is not even
addressed by TRIPs. Patenting of life forms such as bacteria is viewed as
innovative in creating new species and thereby increasing biodiversity.
Patenting, however, could also be considered another form of enclosure.
ENCLOSURES
Discussion of the width of national jurisdiction waters along
coastlines went from three to 12 to 200 nautical miles during the various
UNCLOS meetings. 43 Compromise recognized territorial sovereignty to
12 nautical miles and coastal state jurisdiction to 200 and designated the
44
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The EEZs allowed coastal states
specific and limited rights without recognition of sovereignty and, most
importantly, recognized the legitimate rights of other states in the area.
By insisting on the 200 nautical miles (about 234 land miles), the United
States gained jurisdiction over more territory than any other country
45
when UNCLOS was accepted. Creation of the EEZs brought 35 percent
of the high seas under national jurisdiction for the first time in human
history.46 The creation of EEZs was heralded as both a success and a
failure: states did not gain sovereignty over EEZs, only national
jurisdiction, which brought responsibility as well as rights. At least now,
individual states would have to work to provide environmental security
(e.g., protection against overexploitation) within their new domains.
Others noted that about 99 percent of the catch of the world's fisheries is
taken within EEZ waters, 47 thereby putting boundaries on what had been
48
a common pool.
43.

UNCLOS, supra note 24.

44.

Id.

45.

The United States gained domain over 4.82 millions of nautical square miles;

France, 2.86; Australia 2.41; Indonesia, 1.57; New Zealand, 1.41; United Kingdom, 1.34;
Canada, 1.29; Japan, 1.13. The United States further demanded, and won, rights for
economic purposes over the full extent of the continental shelf, if it extended beyond the
200 nautical miles. SANGER, supra note 26, at 66.
46. Id. at 67.
47.

BRIAN GROOMBRIDGE & MARTIN D. JENKINS, GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY: EARTH'S LMNG

RESOURCES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 176 (2000); WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF FISHERIES: UNCLOS 1982 AND BEYOND (1994).

48. Debates have begun to clarify the concepts of open pool resources, common pool
resources, and common heritage. Open pool refers to resources that are unregulated and
are located where efforts to exclude multiple users would be very costly. This approach to
resource use assumes similar assets and skills, similar ability to access/use, and similar
discount rates and cultural values. The commons or common pool resources, in contrast,
are held in trust by a community of users and benefits are shared. Customs/traditions
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The creation of EEZs signified that the industrial countries
recognized they could not claim the rest of the high seas. By accepting
the EEZ limits, the governments conceded to the principle that the rest of
the oceans were not national territory or private property. Others in the
negotiations felt that acceptance of the common heritage of mankind
beyond the 200-mile limit came at too high a price. Giving nations
sovereignty over a third of the high seas, the portion most accessible to
current technology for fishing and mining, was a concession for
preserving the rest of the two-thirds.
The enclosure for microorganisms, projected for seed and plants,
may be far more extensive. The international law allowing patenting of
microorganisms and biological processes encloses living forms.49 If a
bacterium is modified in a minimal way, that life form can be privatized,
with all others excluded from access to it, unless a royalty fee is paid.
This could be considered the beginning of international acceptance of the
enclosure of biodiversity for individual gain. With plants freely
reproducing themselves, patenting is needed to restrict their distribution
sufficiently to engender profit. 50 Yet enclosure (privatizing) of
seeds/plants will threaten that very heritage, for biodiversity has thrived
on the practice of free exchange of genetic material, both within nature
and by humans. Private, individual property rights over germplasm
limits availability and may be detrimental to variety. 51

regulate use and, therefore, outsiders may be excluded. The common heritage of mankind
is a principle affirming that the resource remain available to all humans, not to be privately
owned, such as outer space and celestial bodies and deep seabeds. Elinor Ostrom,
Reformulating the Commons, in PROTECTING THE COMMONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS 17 (Joanna Burger et al. eds., 2001).

49. WTO, supra note 1, annex 1C,art. 27.3b.
50. Two other methods of restricting plant fecundity are also being pursued by the
biotech industry. The "terminator seed," a plant genetically modified (GM) to produce no
offspring, was recalled after public outrage at creating sterile plants so the seed would have
to be purchased each year. However, research is continuing on the technology and the next
generations may appear on the market. Second, farmers in the United States and Canada
have filed law suits accusing the seed companies of purposefully contaminating their fields
with pollen from GM plants; these strains are often more virile than commercial hybrids
and quickly can take over a field. International trade already recognizes that "genetically
modified free" shipments of grain are two percent (not zero percent) GM grain, an
acknowledgement of the genetic pollution of world grain reserves. Of course, GM seed
must be purchased every year.
51.
FIKREr BERKES, SACRED ECOLOGY: TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 31-32 (1999); FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL
CONFERENCE ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S PLANT
GENETIC RESOURCES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 15-16 (June 17-23, 1996); GLOBAL

BIODIvERsrrY ASSESSMENT (V.H. Heywood ed., 1995); Hope Shand, Intellectual Property, in
FATAL HARVEST: THE TRAGEDY OF INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE 321 (Andrew Kimbrell ed.,
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The unwillingness to exchange is particularly notable because
the biotechnology industry relies on the free availability of germplasm
from developing countries. 52 TRIPs allows the industry to access
germplasm (seeds) from around the world, change one gene or less, and
then privatize the specie without acknowledgement of any kind to the
original keepers of the seed.5 3 It is as if the insertion of one gene can erase
thousands of years of development of a plant. Ignoring science, the legal
interpretation is that the organism is reducible to, or defined by, one
gene. As summarized in an Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) report, "It is underlined that modem
biotechnology has depended from its beginning on an appropriate legal
framework." 54 The legal depiction presented by TRIPs was earlier
evident in the first Bush administration's (1988-1992) strong objection to
article 19 of the CBD because it provides the right to benefit, by the party
supplying the original genetic resources, from the resulting
biotechnological product. The CBD does not define the benefits but
signifies the right.
In contrast to UNCLOS, which encloses just 35 percent of the
oceans, both TRIPs (private property) and the CBD (national territory)
could result in the enclosure of the entire genetic commons of nature.
TRIPs does not address the necessity to preserve the genetic commons;
as analyzed below, the CBD tries to preserve it by putting it under
national sovereignty and calling for its protection as a shared venture
between the state and local communities. The CBD trusts neither the
national governments nor the local community to preserve biodiversity
alone, both having shown themselves capable of selling natural
resources to any bidder. Instead, it sets up a required partnership of the
state with its communities in the "benefit-sharing" principle.

2002); TIMOTHY SWANSON, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION: TRAGEDY
FOR THE COMMONS? (1996).

52. Among the top 150 prescribed drugs in the United States, 56 percent contain
compounds attributable to plants and animals, a contribution that may be translated into
an economic value of at least $80 billion per year. The UNEP study goes on to estimate, "In
addition to direct use benefits, there are enormous other less tangible benefits to be derived
from natural ecosystems....A recent global review...produced a first-order approximation of
some $33 trillion per year as the total value attributable to natural ecosystems, this being
twice the global economy as expressed by the sum of gross national products ($18 trillion
per year). GROOMBRIDGE & JENKINS, supra note 47, at 69.
53. Andrew Mushita & Carol Thompson, Patenting Biodiversity? Rejecting WTO/TRIPs
in Southern Africa, 2 GLOBAL ENVT'L POL. 65, 71-75 (2001).
54. Klaus Bosselmann, Plants and Politics: The International Legal Regime Concerning
Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. INT'L. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 111, 128 (1996).
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BENEFIT SHARING
Equal rights involve equal responsibility for all nations to
maintain the resources of the sea as their common heritage. In earlier
drafts, it was required that those who have the technological capacity to
mine the high seas would share that knowledge for the benefit of all. 55 It
was this provision that delayed the U.S. signing from 1982 to 1994, until
that requirement was removed. 56 If the high seas are a common heritage,
then access should be available to all and technology is key to that
access. Sharing the technology, according to the majority of the world's
governments, would assure access to all and, thereby, benefit all. The
world community would have the technology by which to monitor
conservation of the natural resources and to engage in scientific research
to advance knowledge.
Those who had the technology viewed the high seas as a
commodity and wanted to maintain a competitive edge, even though
they were forbidden to privatize any resources beyond the 200-mile
limit. With the amendment of Part XI, the United States won in its refusal
to accept the "objectionable mandatory transfer of technology
provisions."5 7 Developing countries, however, viewed not sharing the
technology as another form of enclosure, effectively limiting access for
the poor to about 46 percent of the globe's surface. 58 These two
antithetical and contested points of view both still prevail, "since the
sharing of resources is a matter of equity and politics, and thus, not
subject to judicial determination. There exists, as yet, no regime that can
control or manage these elements." 59 One principle has held that all
states, including land-locked states, retain a right to conduct marine
scientific research "exclusively for peaceful purposes." Coastal states
have a right to regulate, authorize, and conduct marine scientific
research in their EEZs, but should "in normal circumstances" grant
0
consent to conduct research to others. 6
The CBD follows UNCLOS in asking for benefit sharing of the
uses of biodiversity. 61 Similarly, developing countries, led by China,
India, and Brazil, argued that the CBD allows them access to bio55. UNCLOS, supranote 24.
56. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 387 (1986). See also
Ctr. for Defense Info., supra note 31.
57.

58.
at 6,7.
59.
60.
61.

FACT SHEET: U.S. OCEANS POLICY, supra note 32, at 5.

Jos6 Luis Vallarta, Law of the Sea: Secrets of the Deep, 36 (No. 4) UN CHRONICLE, 1999,
Oda, supra note 13, at 220.
UNCLOS, supra note 24, arts. 143, 145.
CBD, supra note 2, art. 1, 31 I.L.M., at 823.
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technology that would enable them to exploit their own biological
resources. 62 The compromise became a call for the transfer of technology
and for "fair and equitable sharing of the benefits" when knowledge and
resources are exchanged. 63 In addition, the CBD requires prior informed
consent (PIC) of the local community for access to a bio-resource, not just
64
the central state, which could sell off vital resources for a pittance. All
stakeholders must mutually consent. 65 Materials collected before the
formation of the CBD in 1992 are not covered.
Neither the CBD nor UNCLOS has fully defined benefit sharing,
but discussions prioritize sharing knowledge and funds for research and
development. Discussions have progressed for the CBD, where the need
for exchange is more mutual: the North desires access to the biodiversity
of South countries, while the South would like access to technology. Of
course, all would like to share profits from any practical uses of the
resources. The discussion addresses fees for access to germplasm,
royalties, profit sharing (much more than the estimated zero to 67five
66
percent currently offered), technology, and funds for development.
A report on benefit sharing under the CBD, prepared for the
European Commission by the Kew Royal Botanical Gardens, is the most
comprehensive approach to understanding the various stakeholders in
6
the exchange of benefit-sharing. The study conducted 193 interviews 8 of
representatives from industry, governments, universities, and research
institutes, including genebanks. Their findings disclosed that most
companies only had a "rudimentary grasp" of the basic objectives of the
69
CBD and only a few were aware of the objective of benefit sharing.
Further, few companies had developed policies in response to the CBD;
those staff who said there was a policy relating to the acquisition of
materials said it could not be disclosed to the public. Several did agree
that changes were occurring in business practices as a result of the CBD:
62.

CHASEK, supra note 37, at 119-20. See generally VICENTE SANCHEZ & CALESTOUS

JUMA, BIODIPLOMAcY: GENETIC RESOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1994).

63. CBD, supra note 2, art. 1, 31 I.L.M., at 823.
64. Id. arts. 15, 16, 31 I.L.M., at 828-29.
65. Id.
66. L.T. Chitsike, Food & Agric. Org., Policy and Legislative Guidelines on Benefit
Sharing, Paper Presented at Workshop on Developing Sui Generis National Policies That
Emphasize Community, Farmers' and Breeders' Rights, Zimbabwe (Oct. 29-Nov. 1, 2000);
KERRY TEN KATE & SARAH A. LAIRD, THE COMMERCIAL USE OF BIODIvERSITY: ACCESS TO

GENETIC REsOuRCES AND BENEFIT-SHARING 64, 109,177, 251 (1999).
67. Seventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Kuala Lumpur (Feb. 9-20, 2004), available at www.biodiv.org/meetings/cop7/default.asp (last visited May 22, 2004).
68. TEN KATE & LAIRD, supra note 66, at 11.
69. Id. at 295.
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a decrease in corporate collection activities, greater recourse to materials
from ex situ collections, and an increased role for brokers to negotiate
benefit-sharing relationships. 70
The country with the most powerful biotech corporations has
not ratified the CBD, as it has not yet ratified UNCLOS. One reason
offered by the United States for refusing to sign in 1992 was that bioprospecting contracts, such as the one between Merck and INBio in
Costa Rica, would obviate the need for an international treaty. From this
point of view, benefit sharing should be left up to individual contractors
(corporate and community), not promoted by government interference
(joint ventures). Others, even those involved in bio-prospecting, view an
international treaty as a necessary guideline for the prospecting. 71
GOVERNANCE
The International Seabed Authority (ISBA) is the supreme
authority of UNCLOS to control all the activities of exploration and
exploitation, with the seabed held in trust by the Authority for all
humanity. 72 The Assembly of the Authority includes all contracting
states while the Council consists of 36 states selected in accordance with
specific criteria to guarantee representation of diverse interests: four
members who consume or import more than two percent of minerals
from the deep seas (Area), four members most involved in the conduct of
activities of the Area, six members from developing countries, 18
members elected to ensure equitable geographical distribution of seats
73
on the Council.

70.

Id. at 303, 312.

71. See generally WALTER V. REID ET AL., BIODIvERsrY PROSPECTING: USING GENETIC
RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1993); Peter Drahos, Indigenous Knowledge,

Intellectual Property and Biopiracy: Is a Global Bio-collecting Society the Answer?, 22 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 245 (2000).

72. This brief comparison cannot elaborate all the legal complexities in the ISBA or
WTO. Please refer to the following for more thorough analyses of one or the other: Barry
Hart Dubner, Recent Developments in the International Law of the Sea, 33 INTL LAW. 627
(1999); Lakshman Guruswamy, The Promise of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS): Justice in Trade and Environmental Disputes, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 189 (1998);
Jonathan L. Hafetz, FosteringProtection of the Marine Environment and Economic Development:
Article 121(3) of the Third Law of the Sea Convention, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 583 (2000); Gary
N. Horlick, Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Will the United States Play by the Rules?, 29 J.
WORLD TRADE 163 (1995); John Warren Kindt, Dispute Settlement in International
Environmental Issues: The Model Provided by the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 22
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1097 (1989); Norio Komuro, The WTO Dispute Settlement
Mechanism: Coverageand Proceduresof the WTO Understanding,29 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1995).
73. UNCLOS, supranote 24, art. 161,21 I.L.M., at 1300-01.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

The ISBA holds property rights over submarine material for
humanity, meaning first, it acts as a trustee on behalf of humanity as a
74
whole and second, it may not relinquish control nor rights. As a trustee,
it may engage in joint ventures with corporations to mine the deep
75
seabed (also a concession to the United States) for a period of 25 years.
Similar to the CBD, the Convention calls for sharing of benefits from the
mining but does not attempt to specify what that might be. However, the
Convention seeks distributive justice by restricting potential deep seabed
miners and setting affirmative action to benefit non-mining states. One
idea was that each proposed collaboration would submit two areas of
equal value and the Authority would approve one as a "work site" and
the other as a "reserved site," which would only be exploited for the
76
benefit of developing states.
Under Part XI, the United States changed its own previous legal
above, and asserted the right to mine the ocean
mentioned
ruling,
beyond its national jurisdiction according to its domestic laws. After the
provisions of July 1994 to modify Part XI, states no longer have an
obligation to finance mining activities of the Enterprise, the operating
arm of the ISBA. Curtailing the ability of the Enterprise to conduct
mining without commercial support, this proviso fosters joint ventures.
As Jose Vallarta, the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the ISBA,
stated:
The task of those who work today in the field of the ISBA is
to achieve the universality of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with the effective participation of
the industrialized world... .We are still in the process of
creating an international regime for the deep seabed
77
through the activities of the ISBA and its organs.
The ISBA has responsibility for coordination and regulation of many
activities occurring every day: seabed exploration, mapping, research on
the ocean floor, and development of technologies. Indeed, it has the
powers to carry them out itself. Elizabeth Borgese, a participant in the
UN Law of the Sea conferences, points out that, in the 1970s, private
corporations were active in seabed mining. She concludes, "They failed."
By the 1990s, the actors became "states, state companies, and stateassisted companies," mainly because the private sector alone is "unable
to move ahead on what used to be called 'sound commercial
74.
75.
76.
77.

SHAw, supra note 20, at 389
Id.
Id.
Vallarta, supra note 58, at 7.
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principles."' 78 Joint ventures of private and public enterprises are also
active. The ISBA coordinates all of them.
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, established by
UNCLOS, provides the forum for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Its
major caseload tends to be arbitration over detention of ships and their
crews for fishing unlawfully (e.g., over-fishing) or other violations within
the EEZs. The Tribunal decides the terms of release of the crews and
ships (e.g., posting of bonds) while a case proceeds. Arbitration is
compulsory in most categories of disputes, but some cases are taken to
the International Court of Justice (e.g., maritime delimitation). In 2000,
the parties to UNCLOS established a trust fund, similar to that used by
the ICJ, "to assist states in proceedings before the Tribunal" in order to
overcome financial impediments to seeking judicial arbitration of
79
disputes.
For germplasm or biodiversity, TRIPs is similar to the CBD in
only one way: it enlists the power of individual states for enforcement.
As the states must exercise their sovereignty over biodiversity for the
CBD, individual states must enforce the TRIPs. Lack of enforcement
mechanisms has long been a problem in deterring violation of
international protocols and treaties. WIPO (World Intellectual Property
Authority) has existed for over 100 years, but its enforcement is weak or
non-existent. Now national governments, as members of the WTO, must
provide enforcement mechanisms that are fair, equitable, and
inexpensive against infringement of intellectual property rights.80 "Both
civil and criminal judicial procedures have been prescribed," giving
national courts the power to grant injunctions, assess damages, destroy
offending property without compensation, and award penalty payments
to the rights holder.8 1 Articles 51 through 61 stipulate various border
controls.
Disputes over interpretation of TRIPs, however, fall under the
jurisdiction of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO. Following
procedures of administrative arbitration, the DSB comprises three

78.

Elisabeth Mann Borgese, A Response to Dr.Artemy A. Saguirian, in FREEDOM FOR THE

SEAS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: OCEAN GOVERNANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL HARMONY 388, 390

Jon Van Dyke et al. eds., 1993).
79. Houston Putnam Lowry, Recent Developments in the International Law of the Sea, 35
INT'L LAW. 787, 791 (2001).
80. Frederick S. Ringo, The Trade-RelatedAspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement
in the GATT and Legal Implicationsfor Sub-Saharan Africa, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 121, 135 (Dec.
1994).
81. BHAGIRATH LAL DAS, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION:
FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE 388-89 (1999).
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members per case, appointed by the Secretariat of the WTO. 82
Complaints are submitted in writing to a panel and rebuttal is both
written and oral.8 3 The panel recommends to the DSB, which gives a
ruling; either party may appeal the result to an appellate board. 84 Finally,
if compliance to the appellate ruling is not forthcoming, formal
85
arbitration may be requested but those results are binding.
What is more exact than previous trade arbitration under the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)
are specific time limits for each stage, from submission of arguments in
writing to rebuttals, to written rulings by the panel and DSB, through
appeals and arbitration. That process is allowed one year and
compliance must be within 18 months of the original complaint.86 The
panel and DSB proceedings are confidential unless a party releases its
own brief to the public; neither party nor its representative may crossexamine the other. 87 Members of the panel and DSB are to act in their
individual capacities, not as representatives of any government or
88
agency.
This administrative, rather than juridical, approach to arbitration
was implemented to expedite compromise for quicker resolution of
conflict.89 There has been much controversy over the dispute settlement
process, however, mainly because of its confidentiality and the
composition of the panels and DSB. Developing countries argue that
transparency of all proceedings is necessary for due process. 90
Contending that rulings can be very political in selecting what
"expertise" to advocate, developing countries argue that few decisions
are simply administrative. Perhaps more importantly, there is no
provision in the WTO about conflict of interest of panel or DSB
members. 91 Therefore, experts on technical matters may have
professional experience or national interest that obscures alternative
82. WTO, supra note 1, art. XIII. See also DAS, supra note 81, at 410-19; Carrie P. Smith,
Patenting Life: The Potential and the Pitfalls of Using the WTO to Globalize Intellectual Property
Rights, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 143, 167-69 (2000); LORI WALLACH & MICHELLE
SFORZA, PUBLIC CITIZEN'S GLOBAL TRADE WATCH, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION?:
CORPORATE GLOBALIZATION AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRACY 194-213 (1999); Horlick,

supra note 72; Komuro, supra note 72, at 45.
83. WTO, supra note 1, art. XV.
84. Id. art. XVII.
85. Id. art. XXII.
86. Id. arts. XX, XXI.
87. Id. art. XVIII.
88. Id. art. VIII.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Guruswamy, supra note 72, at 222-33.
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interpretations; none has to be a lawyer. For example, so far every
dispute over whether a national environmental law is a "barrier to trade"
has been ruled in favor of the country advocating "free" trade, an
approach that reduces national standards for environmental protection.
In the realm of patenting, rulings have favored parties claiming
"intellectual property rights," interpreted much more broadly than most
national laws. Critics of this dispute settlement process say rulings that
set precedence will affect the public interest in everything from
environmental security to public health to food security.
The ultimate relief is retaliation for the trade offenses, which is
not a practical measure for smaller, weaker economies against larger,
stronger economies. Retaliation can cross trade sectors, meaning, if the
offense is in the area of services, measures can be taken to restrict or
embargo trade in goods; if the offense is in minerals, retaliation can occur
in coffee or bananas, whatever will most hurt the "offender." For a
highly diverse economy-every developed country -retaliation might
hurt a sector but probably not the whole economy. For developing
economies with indispensable, narrow export sectors, retaliation could
be economically debilitating.
In the area of dumping of goods, the Panel can only determine if
the importing Member evaluated the "facts" accurately; it cannot
recommend compliance. As Das states, "This is a serious curtailment of
the role of the panels. It is particularly significant because a very large
proportion of disputes in recent years has been about dumping." If this
limitation is extended to other areas, as is proposed, "it will make the
whole dispute settlement process almost totally ineffective." 92 Further,
there is no special dispensation for developing countries in adjudicating
dumping charges.
A major difference between the International Tribunal of the
Law of the Sea and the Dispute Settlement Board of the WTO is the
difference between a court of law and an administrative court. Critics of
the latter claim that secrecy, lack of guidelines for conflicts of interest,
and trade retaliation as the main redress for grievances all favor the
industrialized countries. The DSB treats all members as equals, when, in
fact, developing countries' capacity is much less than that of powerful
economies, from presenting expert documentation to enacting trade
retaliation measures awarded by a favorable adjudication. From the
point of view of developing countries, industrialized economies are very
much "first among equals" in the WTO.

92.

Id. at 223.
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A major weakness of the CBD is that it has no enforcement
mechanism. The individual states must devise legislation and its
implementation to protect their biodiversity. Several South countries
have begun drafting such legislation, mainly to offer an alternative to
TRIPs. The continent of Africa, as one example, is quite advanced in
designing its own approach. Scientists, nongovernmental agencies, and
government officials have been key in drafting the model legislation for
the African Union as resistance to the promotion of TRIPs. In July 2001,
the ministers of agriculture of all of Africa accepted the model legislation
as a means to overcome the inequities of TRIPs. 93 The model contains not
only plant breeders' rights, but also farmers' rights 94 and community
rights. Recognizing the role of communities in breeding new varieties,
conserving varieties, and sustaining food supplies, it requires prior
informed consent of local communities for access and use of local
resources. Most important, it fully recognizes the role of women in
preserving biodiversity and requires their full participation in any
decisions about access, exchange, or use.
The draft African model legislation proposes to transform the
recognized by the CBD into legal rights via national
politically
rights
legislation. Enhancement of plant genetic resources by local farmers and
communities will be legally recognized and protected. 95 Not content to
rely solely on central governments, whose budgets have been reduced by
specific programs or by the general trend to diminish the size of the
public sector, the model legislation calls for community, as well as
national, registry of improved varieties. 96 The model advocates that local
community trusts be in charge of any funds gained from the commercial
use of biodiversity. 97 The legislation tries to reduce corrupting power
93. ORG. OF AFR. UNITY, AFRICAN MODEL LEGISLATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE
RIGHTS OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES, FARMERS AND BREEDERS, AND FOR THE REGULATION OF

ACCESS TO BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES (2000). Mushita & Thompson, supra note 53.
94. Farmers' Rights were formulated in 1989 by the FAO. The rights were not defined
in a legal sense, because the term was considered political. They are
rights arising from the past, present and future contribution of farmers in
conserving, improving and making available plant genetic resources,
particularly those in the centres of origin/diversity. These rights are
vested in the international community, as trustee for present and future
generations of farmers, for the purpose of ensuring full benefits to farmers,
and supporting the continuation of their contributions.
Bella Mpofu, Food & Agric. Org., Farmers' and Breeders' Rights, 9, paper presented at
workshop on Developing Sui Generis National Policies, Zimbabwe (Oct. 29-Nov.1 2000).
See also A. Patricia Kameri-Mbote & Philippe Cullet, Agro-Biodiversity and International
Law -A Conceptual Framework, 11 J. ENVTL. L. 257 (1999).
95. Mpofu, supra note 94.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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over a natural resource by calling for both national and local control; it is
not idealistic in assuming either the central government or local
community will automatically employ genetic resources for the public
good but, rather, requires that control be a shared responsibility.
The draft African model legislation is one example of how
national sovereignty over bio-resources might be implemented, for the
proposed African intellectual property protection legislation promotes
principles from the CBD while emphasizing local solutions. 98 It is
important to note that Africa has chosen a continental approach,
encouraging each government to pass the model legislation, with minor
national adaptation, to unify its interpretation and strengthen its
enforcement. Vulnerable economically, and with national boundaries
that reflect European history more than African bio-regions, this
continent provides the initiative that can serve as an example to other
developing regions.
THE WAY FORWARD
As a summary, the chart below offers a quick comparison of
important provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Seas (UNCLOS), the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). As discussed
above, access to the sea and seed ranges from delimitation of private
property under UNCLOS to allowing full privatization under TRIPs to
reaffirming national control under the CBD. The extent of the enclosure
against access is most serious for TRIPs and could potentially be
legalized for all seeds and plants. Sustainable use of resources is a
priority for UNCLOS and the CBD but is not even mentioned in TRIPs.
Similarly, while it has been left undefined, both UNCLOS and the CBD
promote benefit sharing, while TRIPs does not mention it. TRIPs is also
the most narrow in its approach to rights, mainly recognizing individual
rights. UNCLOS is the most ambitious with its principle of the common
heritage of mankind giving equal rights to all beyond the exclusive
economic zones (EEZs) of 200 nautical miles. The CBD enshrines
community and farmers' rights (social group rights) as privileged over
individual rights for seeds and plants, which belong to the common
heritage of local communities. Finally, UNCLOS employs an
international authority as well as legal adjudication for governance.
TRIPs relies on national enforcement, with dispute settlements to follow
98. Interview with Joseph Matowanyika, Director, FAO-LinKS (Local Indigenous
Knowledge Systems) in Harare, Zimbabwe (Aug. 23, 2000). Interview with Barry McCarter,
General Manager, Seed Co. in Harare, Zimbabwe (May 24, 2001).
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administrative panels' rulings that are arrived at without full disclosure
or the ability to cross-examine the opponent. The CBD also relies on
national enforcement' with the condition that prior informed consent
must come from the communities who cultivated the plant. "National"
enforcement, therefore, is modified by the proviso that local
communities participate in drafting agreements about seed exchange
and benefit sharing, including devising local community trusts.
TABLE I: COMPARISON OF TREATIES FOR SEA/SEED
Access to Sea/Seed

Enclosure

Sustainable Use of
Sea/Seed

Benefit Sharing

UNCLOS
International
Delimitation of
private property
200 nautical miles
along coastlines

Priority - common
heritage over
private/national
Interests
Promotes
technology
transfers

Rights

Equal access to all
beyond 200 nm

Governance

Legal adjudication
ISBA

TRIPS
Privatization
Promoted

CBD
National
Sovereignty

Patents or similar
stringent property
protection on
microorganisms-to
be extended to seed
Not mentioned prioritizes private
over public interest

National domain
over biodiversity

None

Private Property only individual
rights recognized
Administrative
adjudication
National
enforcement

Priority prioritizes public
over private
interest
Promotes
technology
transfers
Equitable sharing
of innovations
Community and
farmers' rights
equal to individual
PIC required of
both community/
government
National
enforcement

(Compiled by author)
ISBA - International Seabed Authority
PIC - Prior Informed Consent

What are the lessons from UNCLOS for the sharing of biodiversity? How can the impasse between TRIPs and the CBD be
resolved? By treating the deep seabed as the common heritage for all
humanity, UNCLOS delimits the rule of private property; the deep seas
cannot be privatized simply because an enterprise has the technical
knowledge for prospecting. Representing the link that ties all humanity,
no matter what land mass one inhabits, the deep seas are conserved for
all. Because of the difficulties in implementing UNCLOS, however, those
who wanted to delimit privatization of the gene pool reaffirmed that
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biodiversity was integral to national sovereignty; indigenous bioresources would be regulated under national laws.
The United States, however, refused to ratify the CBD and
industrialized nations actively pursue bioprospecting under terms that
accrue much more profit to the biotechnology corporation than to the
original cultivators of the seed. Slight modification of a resource is
valued more than improvement of a strain for centuries. Among
members of the WTO, economic arguments about "adequate"
compensation for discovery continue to conflict with arguments about
conservation and sharing, rather than enclosing, biodiversity. One side
claims that only with privatization will genetic discoveries, advancing
medicine and food production, continue; others argue that changing one
gene in a living organism, which has been cultivated over centuries, does
not merit owning that life form. Such enclosure will delay, not promote,
innovations for medicine and agriculture. These debates have forestalled
any further development of TRIPs beyond patenting of microorganisms.
South countries, such as the 53 nations in the Africa Union, are
advancing the way forward by legislating national laws for protecting,
while at the same time sharing, biodiversity as advocated by the CDB.
Such an approach delimits individual private property by affirming
community rights over biodiversity, in shared jurisdiction with national
governments. Another initiative among non-governmental organizations
revives the international discussion that the gene pool, like the seabed,
belongs to the common heritage of mankind:
the intrinsic value of the Earth's gene pool.. .precedes its
utility and commercial value ....
[T]he Earth's gene pool, in
all its biological forms and manifestations, exists in nature
and, therefore, must not be claimed as intellectual property
even if purified and synthesized in the laboratory ....
Therefore, the nations of the world declare the
Earth's gene pool.. .to be a global commons, to be protected
and nurtured by all peoples and further declare that genes
and the products they code for, in their natural, purified or
synthesized form...will not be allowed to be claimed as
commercially negotiable genetic information or intellectual
property by governments, commercial enterprises, other
institutions or individuals. 99

99. Treaty Initiative to Share the Genetic Commons (Consortium of Civil Soc'y Orgs.),
Draft Treaty to Share the Genetic Commons (2002), available at http://www.etcgroup.
org/article.asp?newsid=7 (last visited May 16, 2004).
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Only in the preliminary stages of discussion in international
fora, such as the Johannesburg Summit, ten years post-Rio (August
2002), this proposed treaty renews the debates over equity in the use of
.common heritage" resources. As this discourse continues, legal
interpretation and political experience from UNCLOS will become
relevant for clarifying key issues, especially debates over private versus
community versus public property over resources necessary to sustain
all human life. An international law of the seed will develop
dynamically, from shared use and adjudication, as is the international
law of the sea.

